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Abstract 
The Myanmar economy has not been deeply integrated into East Asia’s production 
and distribution networks, despite its location advantages and notably abundant, 
reasonably well-educated, cheap labor force. Underdeveloped infrastructure, logistics 
in particular, and an unfavorable business and investment environment hinder it 
from participating in such networks in East Asia. Service link costs, for connecting 
production sites in Myanmar and other remote fragmented production blocks or 
markets, have not fallen sufficiently low to enable firms, including multi-national 
corporations to reduce total costs, and so the Myanmar economy has failed to attract 
foreign direct investments. 
Border industry offers a solution. The Myanmar economy can be connected to the 
regional and global economy through its borders with neighboring countries, 
Thailand in particular, which already have logistic hubs such as deep-sea ports, 
airports and trunk roads. This paper examines the source of competitiveness of 
border industry by considering an example of the garment industry located in the 
Myanmar-Thai border area. Based on such analysis, we recognize the prospects of 
border industry and propose some policy measures to promote this on Myanmar soil.
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Introduction 
The chairman of the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA) 
deplores the fact that the garment industry in Yangon and its suburbs has been losing 
workers, experienced ones in particular, to Mae Sot, a Thai border town opposite 
Myawaddy on the Myanmar side. His own factory, employing 150 workers, has recently 
lost ten sewing-machine-operators to Mae Sot.1 Why did Myanmar workers leave 
Yangon, the former capital and business center of the country, for a small border town 
on Thai soil? They went there to work at garment factories clustered in Mae Sot. 
The garment industry in Yangon was severely damaged by the United States’ 
sanctions of July 2003, which banned all imports from Myanmar. The industry exported 
nearly half of its products to the United States, and more than eighty percent of United 
States’ imports from Myanmar were clothes. Myanmar’s garment exports declined 
sharply from US$ 829.0 million in 2001 to US$ 312.4 million in 2005, a 62.3% decline.2 
                                                  
1 Personal communication with the chairman on September 4, 2007. 
2 Based on the import data of 22 major importing countries including Australia, Canada, 
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Many factories were closed and many workers lost their jobs.3 Some garment workers 
who were made redundant went to Mae Sot to seek employment. Such a migration 
reflects the poor business situation and serious unemployment in Myanmar, as well as a 
gap in wages between the two countries. It is natural that Myanmar workers migrate to 
Thailand, attracted by abundant job opportunities and higher wages. 
Regarding the location of the garment industrial cluster to which Myanmar workers 
flock, the question is: why are many garment factories located in a small Myanmar-Thai 
border town and not in a bigger city like Bangkok or Chiang Mai? The labor-intensive 
garment industry has clustered in a border town mainly because Myanmar migrant 
workers are available only in border areas. 
Another question arises regarding the location of the garment industry. Why is the 
industry located on the Thai side and not the Myanmar side? Mae Sot and Myawaddy 
are separated by a small river called the Moei. The friendship bridge constructed in 
1997 by the Thai government connects the two towns. The Thai garment industry could 
easily cross the bridge and geographically relocate to Myawaddy, where it could 
probably employ more Myanmar workers at lower wages. In reality, it does not. The 
absence of border industry in Myawaddy implies some hindrance or difficulty 
preventing the Thai garment industry from operating on Myanmar soil. 
Nevertheless, the flourishing border industry in Mae Sot indicates the possibility of 
border industry on the Myanmar side, once such hindrances have been removed and a 
favorable environment has been created. This paper examines factors that promote 
industrial clustering in the Myanmar-Thai border area, and at the same time identifies 
factors that push factories to the Thai side instead of the Myanmar side. We use the 
garment industry in Mae Sot as an example. Based on such analysis, we propose certain 
policy measures to promote border industry on Myanmar soil. 
The first section reviews the historical, political and economic relationship between 
Myanmar and neighboring countries. Such a review will provide readers with 
background knowledge on how border industry has become possible along Myanmar 
and its neighbors’ boundaries, the Myanmar-Thai border in particular. The second 
section will examine factors that promote and retard border industry. Some may 
suggest that border industry will decline as economic integration in East Asia proceeds 
and border barriers disappear. Nevertheless, in reality, border industry is growing 
                                                                                                                                                  
the European Union (15 member countries only), Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore 
and the United States. 
3  Regarding the impact of United States’ sanctions on the garment industry in 
Myanmar, see Kudo [2005b]. 
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rather than diminishing. What is the rationale behind, and sources of competitiveness 
of, border industry? This section addresses this question. The third section will consider 
the garment industry in Mae Sot as an example. Based on firsthand information from 
the field and a questionnaire survey, we identify the advantages of the garment 
industry in Mae Sot in terms of labor, logistics and infrastructure. In conclusion, we 
consider the possibility of border industry on the Myanmar side and suggest certain 
policy measures to promote this. 
 
1. Background 
Myanmar shares long borders with five neighboring countries, namely China (a 
border of 1357 miles), Thailand (1314 miles), India (857 miles), Bangladesh (152 miles) 
and Laos (128 miles) and shares coastal waters with Malaysia and Singapore. There are 
differences in natural resource endowments and industrial development stages among 
them. It should be natural for Myanmar to have stronger economic ties with its 
neighbors. 
In reality, however, Myanmar’s national borders have been closed, for all practical 
purposes, throughout its socialist period (1962-1988). 4 Myanmar pursued a strict 
non-aligned foreign policy and operated on an economic strategy of self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency. The military government (SLORC/SPDC)5 that came into power in 
1988 drastically changed policy, introducing open-door actions such as the liberalization 
of external trade, legalization of cross-border trade with neighboring countries and 
acceptance of foreign investment by enacting the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). 
The open-door policy adopted by Myanmar’s newly-established military government 
was welcomed by neighboring countries, China and Thailand in particular. Following 
the end of the Cold War, China ceased its dual-track foreign policy toward Myanmar, in 
which it endorsed party-to-party relations between the China Communist Party (CCP) 
and Burma Communist Party (BCP), in addition to state-to-state relations (Tin Maung 
Maung Than [2003:194]). Thailand abandoned its secret strategy of using the Karen 
and other ethnic insurgents deployed alongside the border areas as a buffer against the 
Myanmar army and the BCP.6 Chatichai Choonhavan, the Thai Prime Minister from 
1988 to 1991, coined the famous phrase: “Change Indochina from a battlefield to a 
                                                  
4 See Liang [1990] for Myanmar’s foreign policy during the socialist period. 
5 The military took power in a coup in September 1988 and established the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was re-constituted as the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997. 
6 Regarding Thai diplomacy toward Myanmar, see Battersby [1998-99]. 
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commercial field.” The newly-established military government in Myanmar also 
initiated a ceasefire policy with ethnic insurgents, most of whom occupied the border 
areas, in 1989.7 Thus, peace was realized in these areas for the first time. 
Moreover, Myanmar joined the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic 
Cooperation in 1992, which was a significant departure from its traditional neutralist 
foreign policy. Following this, Myanmar joined the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in 1997, the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in 2000 
and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 
in 2003. Myanmar’s open-door policy was well received by East Asian regionalism 
throughout the 1990s, a situation that prevails today. 
Accordingly, Myanmar has strengthened its trade relations with neighboring 
countries. The trade shares of its five neighboring countries, China, India, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand accounted for 70.4% of Myanmar’s exports and 79.5% of its 
imports in 2006 (Table 1). The five countries are also leading investors in Myanmar, 
accounting for 70.2% of the total amount of approved foreign investment, as of March 
2006. 
On the other hand, Myanmar’s economy has been sluggish for some time, although 
the official GDP recorded eight consecutive years of double-digit growth since Fiscal 
Year 1999. The per capita monthly household expenditure in US dollar terms was 
extremely low and stagnated between US $10.9 in 1997 and US $9.9 in 2001.8 Engel’s 
coefficient recorded 71% in 1997 and 72% in 2001, suggesting no significant 
improvement in household incomes. Industrial structural changes are underway, albeit 
slowly. The manufacturing share of Myanmar’s GDP increased from 7.8% in 1990 to 
11.6% in 2004, while that of Cambodia increased from 5.2% to 19.6% during the same 
period (ADB KI). 
Moreover, Myanmar has been subjected to various economic sanctions by the United 
States, the European Union (EU) and other western countries. The hostile international 
environment surrounding the military government and underdeveloped infrastructure 
prevented the Myanmar economy from participating in global and regional production 
and distribution networks. Combined with Myanmar’s open-door policy, geographical 
                                                  
7 See Smith [1999] for details. 
8 The per capita monthly household expenditure was 2626 kyat in 1997 and 5458 kyat 
in 2001 (CSO SY [1998;2004]), which was converted at the prevailing exchange rates of 
240 kyat/dollar and 550 kyat/dollar, respectively. The official exchange rate, however, 
has been pegged at about 6 kyat/dollar. 
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vicinity, economic complementarities, cultural closeness and western countries’ hostile 
attitudes against the military regime, Myanmar has eventually strengthened its 
economic ties in trade, investment and regional cooperation with neighboring countries. 
The opening of the Myanmar border to neighbors has made border industry possible. 
 
2. Factors that Promote and Retard Border Industry 
(1) Economic Integration and Border Industry 
There are several factors affecting the competitiveness of border industry. Borders 
divide nations and create differences in resource endowments and price structures, 
which are sources of economic complementarities. All border industry advantages arise 
from the availability of complementary resources, which exist side-by-side in the 
geographical proximity of border areas. However, these must be transported across 
borders and utilized for production in a border town in one of the countries. In that 
sense, a certain degree of cross-border mobility of productive factors is required for the 
birth and growth of border industry. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between mobility of productive factors and the 
growth of border industry. The Myanmar borders were closed during the socialist period, 
for all practical purposes, and border industry was not possible (the first stage). The 
open-door policy and peace in border areas, which was realized by ceasefire agreements 
between the Myanmar military and ethnic insurgents, lowered border barriers and 
allowed border industry to grow (the second stage). As economic integration progresses 
in the region, cross-border mobility of people, goods and services, capital and 
information will be enhanced. Complete mobility of all goods and services, productive 
factors and other economic elements such as market information and technology across 
nations will ultimately eliminate border industry, because any location in either 
country will then have an equal access to productive factors and there will probably be 
no reason for a remote border town to be chosen as a competitive production base (the 
third stage). 
In reality, borders still exist and create barriers to the movement of productive factors 
and other economic elements. For example, borders prevent people from moving freely, 
divide labor markets and facilitate a gap in wages. There is little possibility of the 
region reaching the stage of a completely integrated economy in the foreseeable future. 
Border industry in this region still has growth potential for a certain period. It is 
therefore worthwhile considering how to promote border industry in the region and how 
the Myanmar economy as a whole can benefit from it. 
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(2) Infrastructure and Logistics 
In East Asia, service link costs, connecting remotely located production blocks, have 
become low enough to take advantage of differences in wages and other location 
advantages (Kimura [2006:17]). Multi-national corporations (MNCs) aggressively 
exploited non-integrated elements such as wage differences and eventually developed 
sophisticated production and distribution networks in East Asia. 
However, the Myanmar economy has not been deeply integrated into such networks 
in spite of its abundant, reasonably well-educated and very cheap labor force: an 
apparent location advantage. Underdeveloped infrastructure, logistics in particular, 
hinders the Myanmar economy from joining production and distribution networks in 
East Asia. Service link costs, connecting firms located in Myanmar and other 
fragmented production blocks and markets, have not become low enough to realize a 
total cost reduction accrual from location advantages due to wage gaps. 
Border industry could offer a solution to overcome such high service link costs 
embedded in the Myanmar economy. The Myanmar economy can connect itself to the 
regional and global economy via borders with neighboring countries, Thailand in 
particular, which have logistic hubs such as deep-sea ports, international airports and 
trunk roads. The required infrastructure investment to connect its border areas with 
the pre-existing infrastructure of neighbors may be far smaller than that for developing 
a nation-wide infrastructure system. On the contrary, a massive investment would be 
required to connect the proper or central part of the Myanmar economy regionally and 
globally. For example, it would be costly to construct a new deep-sea port somewhere on 
the Myanmar coast. Worse still, the new port may not be fully utilized because it would 
be located off the major marine transportation routes, resulting in a shortage of cargoes 
and expensive shipping costs. Firms in Myanmar-Thai border areas, however, can gain 
access to the well-developed Bangkok Port and/or Laemg Chabang Port via 
well-connected road networks in Thailand. 
In border areas, firms will be able to have better access to other infrastructure 
services such as electricity, telecommunications and water, which can be provided by 
neighboring countries. Thus, firms, including MNCs located in border areas, can exploit 
location advantages such as wage differences, and at the same time enjoy lower service 
link costs. 
 
(3) Government Policy on Business Activities 
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On which side of nations should border industry locate itself? In terms of service link 
costs accrual from geographical distance, there should be no difference, in theory, on 
which side of nations firms locate themselves. However, border industry could exploit 
more non-integrated advantages, notably wage differences, if it is located on the side of 
less-developed nations. For example, firms in the Myanmar-Thai border areas could 
employ more workers at lower wages on the Myanmar side than the Thai side, as they 
do not need to follow the minimum wage regulations and restrictive migrant workers 
policies that the Thai government has stipulated. 
In reality, no border industry is located on the Myanmar side. All factories are located 
on the Thai side, and Myanmar migrant laborers move to the Thai side and work there. 
This is due to an inferior business and investment climate on the Myanmar side. Thai 
firms have to make foreign investments to locate themselves in Myanmar, where many 
restrictive regulations, both explicit and implicit, are imposed on foreign firms by the 
host government. The Myanmar government controls external trade strictly, 
particularly cross-border trade, by means of export and import licenses, an export-first 
policy, trade bans on certain items and unexpected closure of border gates. It also 
restricts foreign currency transactions, which create large differences in exchange rates, 
from the official rate of about six kyat to the US dollar, to the market rate of about 1350 
kyat to the US dollar as of mid-September, 2007. Moreover, the Myanmar government 
frequently changes rules and regulations without prior consultation with the business 
sector or even prior notice, which seriously undermines the stability and predictability 
of the business environment in Myanmar. Such unfavorable government policies hinder 
Thai firms from crossing a small river, onto Myanmar soil. 
 
3. Border Industry Example: the Garment Industry in Mae Sot 
This section considers an example of a Myanmar-Thai border industry, that is, the 
garment industry in Mae Sot. Based on discussions in the previous section, we will 
examine how this border industry exploits the location advantages of border areas and 
identify its sources of competitiveness. 
 
(1) Outline 
Mae Sot is a small town in Tak Province in the north of Thailand (Map 1).9 A small 
river called the Moei separates Mae Sot and Myawaddy, a small town in Karen State in 
                                                  
9 The population of Mae Sot was 106,413 in 2000 according to Wikipedia (available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mae_Sot). 
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Myanmar. The two towns form a border gate that is located on the GMS’s East West 
Economic Corridor (EWEC), connecting Da Nang in Vietnam in the east and 
Mawlamyine in Myanmar in the west, through Laos and Thailand. 
For nearly ten years, many factories have been established in, or relocated to, Mae Sot. 
There were 464 factories with 36,821 workers in Tak Province in 2005 (Table 2).10 
Among them, 235 factories, or 51%, were located in Mae Sot, employing 31,876 workers 
or 87% of the total laborers in Tak Province. These figures imply that most 
labor-intensive industries are concentrated in Mae Sot. The textile and garment11 
(hereafter called “garment”) sector is labor intensive. There were 113 garment factories 
in Tak Province in 2005, and most of them were located in Mae Sot. These factories 
employed 26,889 workers or 73% of the total number of laborers in Tak Province. The 
capital-labor ratio of the garment industry was also among the lowest. 
The Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO (IDE-JETRO) conducted a joint study 
with the Economic Research and Training Center (ERTC) of Thammasat University on 
the economic and social aspects of migrant workers, on the garment industry in 
Myanmar-Thai border areas in August and September, 2006.12 A questionnaire survey 
was conducted, covering ten garment factories and 100 Myanmar migrant workers.13 
According to the survey, the garment industry in Mae Sot is quite young. Six out of 
ten garment firms were established after 2001, while two were set up in 1998, and one 
firm in each of 1995 and 1990 (Table 3). Seven garment firms were under sole Thai 
ownership and the remaining three were joint ventures with Chinese investors. Nine of 
them were sub-contractors that produced garments to order for exporters in Bangkok. 
Only one firm in this survey exported its products directly overseas. 
The average number of employees was 423, which is greater than the official statistics 
shown in Table 2, i.e. 298 for the textile industry and 175 for the garment industry. The 
number of workers may be under-reported. Myanmar workers constituted 86% of the 
total number of employees, ranging from 83% to 97%, except for one firm that had no 
                                                  
10 Figures are from the Tak Chapter of the Federation of Thai Industries. 
11 The textile sub-sector here indicates in most cases knitwear apparel production, 
while the garment sub-sector includes woven apparel production. There is almost no 
textile yarn and fabric production, which is more capital intensive, in Mae Sot 
(interviews with the Tak Chapter of the Federation of Thai Industries in September 
2006). In this paper, the author uses “garment industry” to include both sub-sectors. 
12 The author joined a field trip to Mae Sot and Myawaddy with the Thammasat team 
in September 2006. He wishes to thank Dr. Chanin Mephokee, Associate Professor at 
Thammasat University, and Mr. Jarin Cholpaisal, Lecturer at Rangsit University, for 
their cooperation with the survey. See ERTC [2007] for the detailed survey results. 
13  Samples are small and were selected for convenient interviewing. A careful 
interpretation of the data is required. 
 9
Myanmar workers.14 The firms operated for 296 days in 2005, or 25 days per month on 
average. 
When we asked the garment firms to cite reasons for relocating to Myawaddy, only 
two firms out of eight explicitly stated that they did so because of the abundance of 
Myanmar labor. Four firms answered that they just followed their headquarters’ policy 
and the remaining two firms built factories there because the owners were Mae Sot 
residents. The headquarters’ policy must have taken account of the availability of 
Myanmar workers in Mae Sot. Entrepreneurs in Mae Sot started garment factories 
because of the existence of Myanmar workers, and the garment industry there is totally 
dependent on Myanmar workers. The availability of Myanmar migrant workers is 
obviously the main reason why the garment industry has clustered in this small border 
town. 
 
(2) Labor 
The Thai government has responded to requests from employers to allow them to hire 
foreign workers to fill labor shortages in industry, in particular for work called the three 
Ds, i.e. Difficult, Dirty and Dangerous. Following a Cabinet Decision in April 2004, the 
most comprehensive registration to date took place in that year, when the Thai Ministry 
of Interior registered 1,280,000 foreigners during the month of July; 814,000 of those 
had applied for work permits by mid-December (Huguet and Punpuing [2005:30-34]). Of 
the 814,000 persons, 610,000 persons, or three-quarters, were from Myanmar. Of the 
number of work permits issued to Myanmar nationals, Tak Province with 50,932 
permits ranked third, following Bangkok with 98,308 permits and Samut Sakhon with 
67,799. Tak Province is one of the places where abundant Myanmar workers are 
available and employable. 
We examined the workers’ profiles in the questionnaire survey. Out of the 100 
Myanmar workers interviewed, 61 were female. The female ratio of the sample is lower 
than the 74% for the textile and garment industry in Tak Province (Table 2). The 
average age of the workers was 27 years old, ranging from the youngest at 18 years old, 
to the oldest at 36 years old. Out of 61 females, 44 were single and out of 39 males, 20 
were single. 
Regarding their hometown, 23 were from Myawaddy, 20 were from Pa-an, the capital 
of Kayin State, 11 were from Mawlamyine, the capital of Mon State, 9 were from 
                                                  
14 This firm answered that it employed no Myanmar workers out of a total of 390 
employees. However, it responded to a question in the same questionnaire on why 
Myanmar should be employed. It is doubtful that it does not employ Myanmar workers. 
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Yangon, the former national capital, 6 were from Thaton, the former center of the 
ancient Mon Kingdom, and 4 were from Bago, the capital of Bago Division (Map 2).15 
Many of them were naturally from nearby towns like Myawaddy and Pa-an. It is 
noteworthy however that quite a few were from rather distant places, like Yangon and 
Bago. Ninety-six workers were Burmese and the rest were Kayin, Kachin and Akha. 
These figures indicate that the labor market for the garment industry in Mae Sot 
encompasses quite a large spatial area alongside the main road that connects 
Myawaddy and Yangon. 
Out of 100 Myanmar workers, 74 of them entered Thailand after 2002 (Table 4). In 
particular, 2004 and 2005 recorded 25 and 27 persons, respectively. The increase in 
those two years may be related to the relaxation of the Thai government’s policy on 
migrant workers. It may also be related to the collapse of Yangon’s garment industry 
after the United States’ sanctions of July 2003. The garment factories in Yangon may 
have actually lost their workers to factories in Mae Sot, as the MGMA chairman said. 
It is astonishing to note that there were 43 workers who had received no formal 
education, while 36 workers had received an elementary and/or junior-high school 
education (4 to 8 years), 18 workers had a high school education (10 to 11 years) and 
only four workers had obtained a college and/or university level education (12 years or 
more). According to a survey of the garment industry in Yangon in 2005, only 0.8% of 
workers had not received formal education, while 50.5% had been educated for up to 8 
years, 26.7% studied for 10 to 11 years and 21% obtained a college/university level 
education (Kudo [2006:113]). Considering that Myanmar’s gross primary school 
enrollment ratio was 99% for males and 101% for females in 2005 (ADB KI), the 
education level of Myanmar workers in Mae Sot was extraordinarily low. The reasons 
for this gap are unknown. Their work experience in the garment industry was also quite 
poor. Fifty-seven workers had no experience in the garment industry, while 13 had 
worked in garment factories for one year or less, 18 had worked for three years or less 
and only 12 had more than four years’ work experience. Most of those without work 
experience are probably recent entries into Thailand. 
Employees worked for eight hours per day, six days per week. Ninety-two workers 
earned only the minimum wage of 143 baht (equivalent to US $3.8 at the exchange rate 
of September 2006) per day, six workers earned 150 baht per day and two workers 
earned 160 baht or more per day. Their basic monthly wage amounted to 3,575 baht 
                                                  
15 Some places indicated by interviewees were not identified because of incorrect 
transliteration of the Myanmar language by Thai interpreters. 
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(143 baht/day x 25 days) or US $94. On the other hand, garment workers in Yangon 
earned, on average, 17,800 kyat per month, equivalent to about US $20 per month in 
2004 (Kudo [2005b:23]). Most workers in Mae Sot also received overtime pay with the 
higher rates being 23-27 baht per hour (equivalent to 184-216 baht per day). Nominal 
wage differences between the garment industry in Yangon and that in Mae Sot were 
almost five-fold and this wage gap was a strong attraction for Myanmar workers, even 
from distant places.16 
Out of the 100 workers, 79 of them had remitted money to their hometown. According 
to the 30 respondents, the average remittance was 2,393 baht or US $63 per month, 
representing 67% of the minimum wage. Fifty-four respondents answered that their 
remittance was, on average, 16,407 baht, equivalent to nearly seven months’ wages 
during the last few years. All workers lived in Thailand and no one commuted between 
Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Ninety-one workers lived in company dormitories and 71 
workers did not pay for accommodation, while 29 workers paid 645 baht per month, on 
average. Ninety workers were also provided with meals at subsidized prices by their 
employers. Such an inexpensive way of living for Myanmar migrant workers in Mae Sot 
made it possible for them to remit a substantial share of their wages home. Thus, 72 
workers had no intention of returning to Myanmar permanently. 
 
(3) Logistics 
The garment industry in Mae Sot has an advantage in logistics over, for example, that 
industry in Yangon. Suppose one manufactures garments in Mae Sot and exports them 
to Tokyo. The 490-kilometer road connecting Mae Sot and Bangkok is well paved and 
developed, and vehicles can traverse it in 12 hours at a cost of about US $290 (Table 5). 
In Bangkok, there are two major ports: one is Bangkok Port or Klong Toey Port and the 
other is Laem Chabang Port, the latter of which is one of Asia’s leading ports and the 
most important commercial deep-sea port in Thailand. It takes eight or nine days from 
Laem Chabang Port to Tokyo/Yokohama Port and costs US $1,340 to ship a 40-foot 
container.17  Products made in Mae Sot arrive in Tokyo in about 10 days at an 
approximate cost of US $1,630. 
Suppose that instead one manufactures garments in Yangon and exports them to 
Tokyo. Most factories in Yangon have good access to Yangon Port, in one or two hours, 
                                                  
16  If their education background indicates the workers’ skill level, the wage gap 
becomes wider because workers in Yangon had a better educational background than 
those in Mae Sot. 
17 Based on information from JETRO [2007]. 
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at an approximate cost of US $50. However, no vessels sail directly to Japan and 
cargoes have to be transshipped via Singapore Port. It takes four to five days from 
Yangon Port to Singapore Port and costs US $650 to ship a 40-foot container.18 Only 
two vessels are available every three days. Transshipment takes at least another day. It 
takes seven days from Singapore to Tokyo/Yokohama Port and costs US $940 to ship a 
40-foot container. In total it takes 13 days from Yangon to Tokyo and costs US $1,740, 
plus transshipment charges in Singapore Port. 
In reality, the latter route takes more time and expense. Garment firms in Yangon 
need to apply for export and import licenses for each transaction and in order to do so 
they have to go as far as Naypyidaw, the new capital, located about 300 kilometers 
north of Yangon. It usually takes about two weeks to obtain one export and/or import 
license, as the Trade Policy Council chaired by General Maung Aye, Vice-Chairman of 
the SPDC sanctions each license individually. Moreover, cargoes are often kept in port 
for a considerable time for inspection and customs clearance. On the contrary, Bangkok 
Port or Laem Chabang Port apparently provides much more efficient services. 
The garment industry in Mae Sot has an advantage in the procurement of raw 
materials as well. According to the survey, four of the eight respondent firms used only 
Thai domestic raw materials. One respondent used 73% domestic material with the 
remaining 27% being imported, and three used imported material only. Conversely, the 
garment industry in Yangon has been completely dependent on imported raw materials. 
They import everything: fabrics, accessories, threads and even plastic bags, except 
perhaps cardboard boxes. As already stated, in Myanmar it takes time to import 
materials of any kind. Garment firms in Yangon need a longer lead time for production 
because of the procurement of raw materials from abroad. A longer lead time hinders 
Myanmar’s garment industry from sewing seasonal and/or fashion apparel items, which 
requires quick responses (QR). It is an advantage for garment factories located in Mae 
Sot to be able to use both domestic and foreign raw materials. 
In order to reduce transportation time and costs in Myanmar, road transport has 
recently attracted attention. Table 5 shows a comparison between road and marine 
transport from Bangkok and Yangon (Map 3). 19  Road transport could offer 
advantageous alternative logistics to the marine route, in terms of both time and cost. 
However, the road route is not yet available for commercial transportation of cargo. The 
road conditions on some parts of the route are dangerous for large vehicles to traverse. 
                                                  
18 Personal communication with the MGMA chairman on September 4, 2007. 
19 Road transportation figures are based on a trial run by a truck operated by Sankyu 
Inc., a leading Japanese logistics company, in December 2004. 
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The 38-kilometer road between Kawkareik and Thingannyinaung crosses the Dawna 
Range and a hilly part of it is restricted to one-way traffic, i.e. odd days for ascending 
vehicles and even days for descending vehicles. In addition, the border crossing through 
Myawaddy requires tedious and time-consuming negotiations with the Myanmar 
authorities in advance. 
This route constitutes part of the EWEC and road construction is planned to be 
completed in 2008, with Thai assistance. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
for the Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) between Myawaddy and Mae Sot is 
being finalized, and this will promote smoother border crossings through this border 
gate in the near future. Possible reduced transportation costs resulting from the 
completion of the EWEC may benefit Yangon more than Myawaddy-Mae Sot. However, 
border industry can strengthen its industrial linkages with that in Yangon, and stand a 
good chance of enhancing its competitiveness. 
 
(4) Electricity 
Myanmar has experienced a long-standing national power shortage since the late 
1990s. A shortage of electricity is one of the most serious problems in the garment 
industry as well as in other manufacturing sectors in Myanmar. In the garment 
industry survey in Yangon in 2005, we asked garment firms to rate how severely poor 
infrastructure services obstructed their operations regarding telecommunications, 
electricity and transportation (Kudo [2006:113]). Table 6 shows that electricity is 
regarded a severe problem in garment production. In the same survey, 69 firms among 
the 139 respondents answered that they had experienced power interruptions more 
than three times a day and that these had often lasted for more than three hours. 
Therefore, most manufacturers had to use their own and/or share generators. Out of 
141 garment factories, 134 factories had used their own or shared generators. 
The State-owned Economic Enterprises (SEEs) Law, promulgated in 1989, stipulates 
12 economic enterprises that SEEs continue to monopolize, including many 
infrastructure services such as post and telecommunications, air and rail transport, 
banking and insurance, broadcasting and television and electricity.20 Myanmar Electric 
and Power Enterprise (MEPE), a SEE that falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Electric Power, is the sole legal provider of electricity in Myanmar. 
However, in Myawaddy many households are provided with power by a Thai company 
                                                  
20 Some of the 12 sectors are, however, in reality, open to private enterprises, provided 
the Myanmar government so permits. 
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located in Mae Sot, which is deemed illegal according to SEE law. The Myanmar 
consumers pay electricity charges in baht, the use of which is also illegal, as possession 
of foreign currency by Myanmar citizens is prohibited by law. The provision of 
electricity to households in Myawaddy through the power grid from Mae Sot seems to be 
based on an understanding between the regional authorities in both countries, although 
the precise arrangements remain unclear. This example shows that cross-border 
transmission of electricity is possible between the two border towns. Once legal and 
institutional arrangements have been finalized between the two governments, factories 
located in Myawaddy could be officially and regularly provided with electricity from the 
Thai side of the border. 
 
Conclusion: Turning the Periphery into the Center of Growth 
Contrary to the general impression that border areas are remote and backward 
regions, they are better off than the proper or central region of Myanmar. It is rather 
surprising to see that the four regions with the highest per capita household 
expenditure share borders with Thailand, China and Bangladesh (Table 7). These 
regions are also growing more rapidly in Myanmar, widening the gap between border 
areas and other regions. The Myanmar economy is thus characterized as a “poor center 
and rich periphery”.21 
The periphery, as defined by views from Yangon and Mandalay, is no longer the 
periphery viewed from a wider geographic perspective, such as the GMS. Myanmar’s 
border area is closer to more dynamic economies like Thailand and China than to the 
proper and central part of Myanmar. It could be regarded as a conduit that relays 
economic vitality into the proper part of Myanmar, where the economic situation has 
long been depressed. Border industry could function as such.  
In this paper, we firstly examined the prospects of border industry along Myanmar’s 
neighboring boundaries. Border industry has a good chance of growing, as it can exploit 
the location advantages in Myanmar, notably an abundant and cheap labor force, while 
avoiding high service link costs accrued mainly from underdeveloped infrastructure and 
restrictive and cumbersome red tape on business activities, which are embedded in the 
Myanmar economy. 
Among the location advantages in Myanmar, human resources are the most 
important. The Thai population of prime labor, aged 15-39 years, is no longer growing 
                                                  
21 Kurosaki et al. [2004] also described Myanmar’s rural economy as a “rich periphery 
and poor center”. 
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but Myanmar’s is still increasing by 1.3 per cent per annum (Huguet and Punpuing 
[2005:5]). The wage difference between Mae Sot and Yangon is as much as five-fold, as 
discussed in this paper. Unemployment and underemployment are widespread in 
Myanmar, while Thai laborers are no longer willing to work in the “three D” jobs. On 
one hand, creating jobs for the young population is a compelling task for the Myanmar 
government: on the other hand, filling the gap between demand and supply in labor 
markets is an urgent task for the Thai government. 
It is therefore important to legalize and formalize Myanmar migrant workers in 
Thailand. The Thai government signed a MOU on Cooperation in the Employment of 
Workers with the Myanmar government in June 21, 2003. As part of MOU 
implementation programs, the Myanmar government opened border passport centers in 
Myawaddy, Tachileik and Kawthoung in November 2006, which issue temporary 
passports to Myanmar workers who have Thai work permits.22 As mentioned before, 
the Thai government has also tried to control and regularize migrant workers by 
registration, issuance of work permits, provision of protection and repatriation of 
workers who have completed their terms and conditions of employment. However, the 
results of interviews with Myanmar workers in Mae Sot showed that most of them have 
no intention of returning home permanently. Legal and due repatriation will continue 
to be difficult to enforce. 
An effective alternative to migrant workers in Thailand is to relocate the industrial 
cluster to the Myanmar side. Secondly, in this paper, we examined why garment 
factories in Mae Sot have not crossed the small river to Myawaddy, where more 
abundant and cheap workers are available. This is mainly because of the Myanmar 
government’s restrictive policies on businesses, foreign ones in particular. 
The establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) can be an effective policy tool to 
promote an industrial cluster on the Myanmar side. SEZs that include export 
processing zones (EPZs) and free trade zones (FTZs) have been widely established in 
East Asia and export-oriented industries that led the developing economies in the 
region were typically located in such zones. SEZs are designed to insulate themselves 
from the rest of the economy, where the business and investment climate is unfavorable, 
as is the case in Myanmar. SEZs are also provided with better infrastructure services 
such as transportation, telecommunications and energy. 
On October 19, 2004 the Thai Cabinet endorsed the Mae Sot Border Economic Zone 
Project, which covers Myawaddy as well (Huguet and Punpuing [2005:35]). In such 
                                                  
22 The Irrawaddy Online News dated November 15, 2006. 
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special zones, the cutting, making and packing (CMP)23, a type of production on 
consignment, through cross-border trade should be allowed, for example. In this system, 
garment firms located in a special zone in Myawaddy can import raw materials through 
cross-border transactions via Mae Sot free of duties and without tedious import controls, 
sew and knit clothes, and export products through the same border gate. The CMP 
system is currently applicable only to overseas transactions via the seaport in Yangon. 
As another example, owners and managers of firms located in an SEZ in Myawaddy can 
be given access to both countries without visas, since they frequently need to travel 
between factories in Myawaddy and head offices in Yangon, Bangkok or other cities. 
Because Myawaddy does not have an airport, factories’ owners and managers, either 
Myanmar or foreigners, should have free access to the airport in Mae Sot. All these 
schemes will enhance the attractiveness of SEZs and could eventually form an 
industrial cluster on the Myanmar side. 
Border areas in Myanmar are no longer regions that depend on assistance from the 
center. On the contrary, they are frontiers and conduits that absorb the economic 
energy of emerging countries, such as Thailand and China at present and India and 
Bangladesh in future, into the core part of the Myanmar economy. The Myanmar 
government needs to recognize the significance of a vibrant border industry and to place 
it properly in Myanmar’s national industrial development strategy. 
 
                                                  
23 As for CMP, see Kudo [2005a:30-33].  
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Figure 1: Relationship between Mobility of Productive Factors and Border Industry 
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MAPS 
 
Map 1: Tak Province and Mae Sot 
 
(Source) wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mae_Sot). 
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Map 2: Yangon and Myawaddy Route 
 
(Source) MEMI [2007:57].
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Map 3: Road and Marine Routes for Transport 
Between Bangkok and Yangon 
 
 
(Source) JETRO [2007] ASEAN Logistics Network Map. 
 
 
 
 
